报告摘要：We study a common scenario in industry where returns to scale are nondecreasing and thus full cooperation via pooling all the resources together among related firms is the most efficient way of production. This scenario is usually modelled as a class of cooperative games, referred to as resource pooling games. We argue that resource pooling games could be better understood via directly analyzing the underlying functions that are referred to as the cooperative functions than via analyzing the reduced cooperative games. By combining the works of Sharkey and Telser (1978) and Aubin (1981), we provide a framework for analyzing cooperative functions. We focus on cooperative functions that are supportable in that nonemptiness of the core is guaranteed for all related resource pooling games, and argue that Aubin core can be adapted to study cooperative functions and has several remarkable advantages over the core. Various related solution concepts, including PMAS, We find that a cooperative function always derives a convex game if and only if it is supermodular and coordinate-wise convex. We provide several applications, including linear production games, EOQ games, and newsvendor games.
个人简介. 曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月加盟北京交通大学经济管理学院，任“卓越百人计划”教授。主要研究兴趣为博弈论及其应用，包括网络博弈和算法博弈论等。在相关领域主流刊物发表（或接受）论文20余篇，包括Operations Research、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Social Choice and Welfare 和Theoretical Computer Science等期刊以及ACM Economics & Computation等会议。获中国决策科学青年科技奖和关肇直青年研究奖。任中国运筹学会博弈论分会副秘书长、中国运筹学会和中国系统工程学会青年工作委员会委员、中国运筹学会决策科学分会和排序论分会理事等。